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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a Directed Threshold Multi-Signature Scheme. In this 
threshold signature scheme, any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of 
signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set. This 
threshold signature scheme is applicable when the message is sensitive to the signature receiver; 
and the signatures are generated by the cooperation of a number of people from a given group of 
senders.  
Key words. Digital signature, Directed signatures, Multi-signatures, Threshold-signatures, 
Lagrange interpolation, discrete logarithm problems.  
1. Introduction 
Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to authenticate electronic communications. Digital signature 
scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to sign a document in such a way 
that anyone can verify the signature on the document (using her/his public key), but no one can forge the 
signature on any other document. This self-authentication is required for some applications of digital 
signatures such as certification by some authority.  
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However, in some cases the message is sent 
by one organization and requires the approval or consent of several people. In these cases, the signature 
generation is done by more than one consenting person. A common example of this policy is a large bank 
transaction, by one organization, which requires the signature of more than one partner. Such a policy 
could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution 
increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. To solve this problems, 
Multisignature schemes [10,11,13,17,18] and threshold signature schemes [5,6,7,9,12,20] are used where 
more than one signers share the responsibility of signing messages 
Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by 
Desmedt [5, 6, 7]. In 1991, Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature 
scheme based on the RSA system. 
In (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any subgroup of t or more   shareholders of the designated group 
can generate a valid group signature in such a way that the verifier can check the validity of the signature 
without identifying the identities of the signers. In threshold schemes, when any t or more shareholders 
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act in collusion, they can impersonate any other set of shareholders to forge the signatures. In this case, 
the malicious set of signers does not have any responsibility for the signatures and it is impossible to trace 
the signers. Unfortunately, with threshold schemes proposed so far, this problem cannot be solved. 
In multisignature schemes, the signers of a multisignature are identified in the beginning and the 
validity of the multisignature has to be verified with the help of identities of the signers. For 
multisignatures, it is indeed unnecessary to put a threshold value to restrict the number of signers. 
Consider the situation, where a group of anonymous members would have to generate a multisignature. 
The members of this group use pseudonyms as their identities in the public directory. What concerns the 
verifier most is that a message is signed by at least t members and they indeed come from that group. 
Nevertheless, the verifier has no way to verify whether a user is in fact a member of that group because of 
the anonymity of the membership. In this case, the multisignature schemes cannot solve this problems, 
however, the threshold signature schemes do. 
On the other hands, there are so many situations, when the signed message is sensitive to the 
signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business 
transactions are such situations. Signatures used in such situations are called directed signatures [1, 2, 3, 
14, 15, 19, 23, 24]. In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver has full control over the signature 
verification process and can prove the validity of the signature to any third party, whenever necessary. 
Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation. 
Combining these ideas, we propose a digital signature scheme named as Directed - threshold multi - 
signature scheme. The proposed scheme is based on Shamir’s threshold signature scheme [21] and 
Schnorr signature scheme [22]. These basic tools are briefly described in the next section. This paper is 
organized as follows: - 
The section-2 presents some basic tools. Section-3 proposes a Directed - threshold multi - signature 
scheme. Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration is discussed in section-5.  
Remarks are in section-6.  
2. Preliminaries 
Throughout this paper, we will use the following system setting.  
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 <  p  < 2 512 ; 
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 <  q  < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p – 1; 
• A number g, where   g      k (p –1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1  k  p –1 such that g 
>1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp*
 
). 
• A collision free one-way hash function h [25]; 
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The parameters p, q, g and h are publicly known. Every user has two keys one private and one public. 
We assume that a user A chooses a random Ax ∈ Zq and computes Ay  = Αxg   mod p. He keeps Ax  as his 
private key and publishes Ay  as his public key. 
  In Schnorr’s signature scheme the signature of the user A on the message m is given by 
( Ar , AS ), where,   
                 Ar    =    h (g Ak  mod p, m),   and     AS      =    Ak  − Ax . Ar mod p. 
     The signature are verified by checking the equality    
             Ar               =              h ( g AS    y Ar  mod p , m ) . 
Threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into n users in such a 
way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t – 1 or less users reveal nothing 
about the secret. There are many realization of this scheme, we shall use Shamir’s scheme. This scheme is 
based on Lagrange’s interpolation in a field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t – 1 is randomly 
chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. Each user i is given a public identity iu and a secret share f ( iu ). Now 
any subset of t shareholders out of n shareholders can reconstruct the secret K =  f (0), by pooling their 
shares and using 
                       f (0)           =      q
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Here we assume that the authorized subset of t users consists of shareholders i for i =1,2,3…t. 
3. Directed - threshold multi - signature scheme 
The signer of the conventional digital signature schemes is usually a single person. But when the 
message m 	
 is transmitted by an organization S to a person R 
and the message requires the approval of more than one person then the responsibility of signing the 
messages needs to be shared by a subset HS of t or more signer from a designated group GS of n users 
belonging to the organization S. 
From the point of view of the signing group, what the group concerns is the 	

				




	

. On the other hand, from the verifier point of view, 


	

	(not the membership of the members in that group)
 
 	 	 The signature receiver R can verify the signature and that R can prove its 
validity to any third party C, whenever necessary. Nobody can check the validity of the signature without 
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the help of R.  Both the ( t , n 

	   
 and the 

 couldn’t solve this problem independently. 
In this paper, we are going to combine the idea of (t, n) 

	  
 



and propose a threshold signature scheme, 
called the Directed - threshold– multisignature scheme, to solve the above problem.  
For our construction, we assume that there is a  
	   
 
determines the group secret keys, all shareholders’s secret shares, and a 	 who 
takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature. 
This scheme consists of the following steps: - 
3.1.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S 
(a).  selects the group public parameters p, q, g and a collision free one way hash 
function h [25]. SDC also selects a polynomial      
f S(x) = a0 + a1x +….a t-1 xt-1 mod q, with  a0     =    Sx     =   f S(0). 
(b).  computes the group public key, Sy , as,  
                                   Sy                   =                g 
 f 
S
(0)
 mod p. 
(c).  randomly selects K ∈ Zq and computes a public value   
                      W                     =                 g K− mod p.  
 
(d).  randomly selects Ki ∈ Zq and computes  
                           li                                   =              [Ki          +       f S( iSu )] mod q. 

iSu 
	


	 	
(e). SDC computes a public value
iSv   for each member of the group GS , as, 
                             
iSv                  =                li . 
K
Siy  mod p. 
         
iSy 
	


	 	                           
(f). SDC sends  {
iSv , W } to each user i  in the group GS through a public channel.  
(g). SDC also needs to computes public values, mi and ni, as ,   
mi           =       
ilg   mod p  and   ni        =      iKg  mod p. 
3.2.Partial Signature generation by any t  users and verification 
If any t members of the organization S out of n members agree to sign a message m for a  person R. R 
possesses a pair ( Rx , Ry ). Then the signature generation has the following steps. 
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(a) Each user i ∈ HS   randomly selects 1iK and 2iK  ∈  Zq and computes   
                 ui      =     g 2iK− mod p, vi        =      g 1iK  mod p and  wi        =   g 1iK  Ry 2i
K
 mod p. 
(b) Each user makes  ui , wi  publicly and vi secretly available to each member  i ∈ HS . Once all ui  
,vi and  wi are available, each member i ∈ HS computes  the product US , VS  , WS and a hash 
value RS , as, 
US          =          qu
SHi
i mod∏
∈
,        VS          =             qv
SHi
i mod∏
∈
, 
WS         =           qw
SHi
i mod∏
∈
 and  RS      =           h (VS  ,m) mod q. 
(c) Each user i ∈ HS  recovers his/her secret share  li, as , 
            li                     =             iSv
iSxW mod  p. 
(d) Each user i ∈ HS modifies his/her shadow, as, 
         
iSMS                      =                 li . quu
u
ji
j
SS
St
ijj
mod
,1 −
−∏
≠=
. 
(e). Each user i ∈ HS uses his/her modified shadow iSMS and computes a value si , as, 
                                    si                       =                   1iK   +   iSMS .RS mod q. 
(e) Each member i ∈ HS sends his partial signature to the 	. 
(f) The  verifies the partial signature ( si , vi , RS ) by the following congruence,                                                                                                                                         
                                               g is                         ≡
?
             vi  .
 
S
ijSHj jSiS
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mod
mod p.  
If this congruence holds, then the partial signature (si , vi , RS ) for shareholder i is valid. 
3.3.Group Signature generation 
(a).  can computes the group signature SS by combining all the partial signature, as,  
                     SS                      =               
∈ SHi
si mod q. 
            
		

				

. 
(b).  sends { SS , US ,WS  , m} to R as signature of the group S on the message m. 
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3.4. Signature verification by R 
To verify the validity of the group signature {SS , US ,WS  , m } 



 Rx  This sub-section consists of the following steps: - 
(a) The verifier R computes a verification value E, as, 
E                =             ∏
∈








−
−∏
≠∈
Hi
q
uu
u
i ijSHj jSiS
jS
n
mod
0
,
mod p. 
(b). The verifier R can recovers the values RR  and RS ,as 
RR      =       WS. R
x
SU mod p  and   RS           =        h (RR  , m ). 
(c). The verifier R uses the following congruence to check the validity of the signature 
g SS                             ≡
?
                  RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p. 
If this congruence holds, then the group signature {SS , US ,WS  , m}  is valid signature of the 
organization S on the message m. 
3.5.Proof of validity by R  to any  third party C 
(a). R computes  µ   = US Rx  mod p and RR      =     µ  .WS  mod p.   
(b). R sends { RR, E, SS , US , m, µ} to C. 
(c). C recovers RS    =  h (RR  , m ) and uses the following congruence to check the validity of the 
signature  
g SS                             ≡
?
                  RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p. 
                 If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the next step. 
(d) In a zero knowledge fashion R proves to C that log
 
SU
 µ     =    log g Ry  as follows:-  
• C chooses random u, v ∈ Zp computes w = (US )u . g v mod p and sends w to R. 
• R chooses random  ∈ Zp computes  = w. g α mod p, γ  =  Rx  mod p and sends , γ to C. 
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w   =   (US )u . g v mod p. 
• R sends  to C, by which she can verify that            
              =     (US )u . g v +α mod p,     and       γ       =          (µ  )u  Ry  v +α  mod p. 
4. Security discussions 
In this sub-section, we discuss the security aspects of proposed scheme. Here we discuss several 
possible attacks. But show that, none of these can successfully break our system. 
(a). 	
 Sx  
!	 
	 Sy "  
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This is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. No one can get the secret key Sx , since fS  
is a randomly and secretly selected polynomial.  On the other hand, by using the public keys Sy  no one 
can get the secret keys Sx  because this is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. 
(b). 	


	
iSu ∈ 		 
#	

iSv 
	 iSu 
K
Siy 	"
No because fS  is a randomly and secretly selected polynomial and K is also a randomly and secretly 
selected integer by the SDC. 
(c). 	


	
iSu ∈ 		
#	 
                                            fS ( iSu )            =            iSv iS
xW mod  p  ? 
Only the user i can recovers his secret shares, fS ( iSu ), because fS   is a randomly and secretly selected 
polynomial and
iSx  is secret key of the user i∈ GS.  
(d). 	
	
	
iSMS $ 1iK $	 ∈
		 
#	
                      si                    =            1iK   +   iSMS .R S mod q  ? 
It is computationally infeasible for a forger to collect the
iSMS , integer 1iK , RS and partial signature 
si ,i ∈ GS .   
(e). 
	
			 
#	$ 
                    SS                   =              
∈ SHi
si mod q   ? 
Obviously, this is computationally infeasible for DC. 
(f). 		∈"
A forger may try to impersonate a user i ∈ HS ,  by randomly selecting  two integers 1iK and 2iK ∈ Zq 
and broadcasting ui , vi   and  wi.. But without knowing the secret shares, fS ( iSu ) and RS ,  it is difficult to 
generate a valid partial signature si to satisfy the verification equations, 
                  g is                         ≡
?
             vi  .
 
S
ijSHj jSiS
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mod p.     
 8 
(g).  	 	   %		 	  	 &  
 		 #	,                                                                                                                                                                             
g SS                        ≡
?
               RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p  ? 
A forger may randomly selects an integer RR and then computes the hash value RS such that   RS            =        
h (RR  , m) mod q. 
Obviously, to compute the integer SS  is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. On the 
other hand, the forger can randomly select RS and SS  first, then try to determine a value RR that satisfy 
the equation  
                   g SS                          ≡
?
                RR  . ( E . SRSy )  mod p. 
 However, according to the property of the hash function h, it is quite impossible. Thus, this 
attack will not be successful. 
(h). 		

					
		
	"
According to the equation, 
                      fS (x)   =   q
uu
ux
uf
jSiS
jSt
ijj
t
i
iS mod)(
,11 −
−∏
≠==
, 
the secret polynomial fS  can be reconstructed with the knowledge of any t secret shares, fS ( iSu )  i ∈ 
GS  .   
 But in our proposed scheme, the secret shares li ,  i ∈ GS  , contains the integer Ki which only the 
trusted SDC knows and has to be removed first before reconstructing the polynomial  fS (x). A malicious 
shareholder i may try to retrieve the integer Ki from the public key ni. However, the difficulty is same as 
solving the discrete logarithm problem. Thus, any t or more shareholders cannot conspire to reconstruct 
the polynomial fS (x) by providing their own secret shares.  
	$	'	


			
	
$

	
	
		
	
5. Illustration 
 The following illustration is supporting our scheme for practical implementation. Suppose       
=SG 7, =SH 5,        p      =      47,   q    =    23, g     =     25. 
5.1. Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S 
(a).  selects a polynomial   f S (x) = 13  + 18 x 4 mod 23, so Sx  = 13 and Sy  = 16.                                                    
(b).  randomly selects K = 14 and computes a public value W = 2.                                                                                                                      
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(c).  computes the secret key, public key, secret share and public value
 
for each member of 
the group GS, as shown in the following table. 
 
5.2Signature generation by any t users 
If any five users S2, S4, S5, S6 , and S7 out of seven members agree to sign a message m, for a person R 
possessing Rx = 9, Ry = 2 then the signature generation has the following steps. 
(a). S2  randomly selects 12K = 18, 22K = 17 and computes  u2  = 18, v2   =  4 and  w2   = 3. 
(b). S4  randomly selects 14K = 17, 24K = 19 and computes u4  =  8, v4    = 34 and  w4  =  8. 
(c). S5  randomly selects 15K  = 14, 25K = 13 and computes u5  =   3, v5  = 24 and w4  = 7. 
(d). S
 6 randomly selects 16K = 19, 26K = 21 and computes u6  =14, v6   =  6 and  w6   =  25. 
(e). S7 randomly selects 17K =  16, 27K = 18 and computes  u7  =12, v7  = 7 and  w7   =  34. 
(f). Each user computes the product  US   = 8,VS   =  36, WS  = 14 and  RS   = 9 (let). 
(g). S2   recovers his/her secret share l2     =  20 and computes 2SMS    =  10, s2   =  16.       
(h). S4  recovers his/her secret share l4     =  20 and computes 4SMS   =  16, s4   =     0. 
(i).  S5  recovers his/her secret share l5     =    5 and computes 5SMS   =    6, s5   =    22. 
             (j).  S6  recovers his/her secret share l6     =    7 and computes 6SMS   =   5, s6    =    18. 
             (k). S7  recovers his/her secret share l7     =  20 and computes 7SMS   =    5, s7   =    15. 
5.3. Partial signature verification and Signature generation by DC 
(a) DC verifies each partial signature. For example for user S2 ,  
         VALUE 
USER 
Secret 
  ix  
Public 
  iy  
Secret 
   iK  
Secret 
fS( iSu )    
Secret 
  il  
Public 
  im  
Public 
  in  
Public 
iv  
 User–S1 13 16 8 2 10 3 17 41 
 User–S2 18 4 22 21 20 9 32 29 
 User–S3 19 6 10 16 3 21 3 1 
 User–S4 20 9 17 3 20 9 34 19 
 User–S5 17 34 14 14 5 12 24 38 
 User–S6 22 32 16 14 7 27 7 14 
 User–S7 15 36 21 22 20 9 37 44 
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               s2      =  16 , v2   =   4, m2  =   9, RS = 9, 23mod
2.7,6,5,4 ji
j
SS
S
ij uu
u
−
−∏
==
  =  12. 
He checks     25 16           ≡
?
          4
  
.
 ( )9129 mod 47.This holds. 
              Similarly, he checks other partial signatures.                   
(b).  computes a group value SS  =  2 and sends { 2 , 14 ,8  , m } as signature of the group S for 
the message m. 
5.4. Signature verification by the person R 
(a). The verifier R computes a verification value E   =  18. 
(b). The verifier R can recovers the values RR   =   36 and RS   =   9. 
(c). The verifier R uses the following congruence to check the validity of the signature 
25 2                   ≡
?
 
          36
 
. ( 18.16) 9 
 
mod47. 
 This congruence holds, so the group signature {2 ,14
 
,8
 
,m}  is valid signature of the 
group S on the message m  for the person R.  
5.5. Proof of validity by R to any third party C 
(a). R computes  µ = 16, RR = 36 and sends {36, 18,2,8 , m,16} to C. 
(b). C recovers RS    = 9 and check the concurrence 25 2   ≡
?
 
  36
. 
(18.16) 9 for the validity of the 
signature. This holds; so, C goes to the next steps. 
(c). R in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that log
 8 16    =    log 25 2 as follows:-  
• C chooses random u = 9, v = 11 and computes w = 25 and sends w to R. 
• R chooses random  = 37 computes  = 36, γ  = 9 and sends , γ to C. 
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w   =   25. 
• R sends  to C, by which she can verify that  = 36 and  γ  = 9. 
6. Remarks 
In this paper, we have proposed a Directed –Threshold Multi - signature Scheme. There is a 
trusted SDC that determine the group secret keys, all shareholders’s secret shares, and a designated 
combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a 
group signature, but no secret information is associated with the DC. 
In this threshold signature scheme, any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of 
signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set. Any t or more 
shareholders acting in collusion cannot conspire to reconstruct the polynomial fS (x) by providing their 
own secret shares and hence they cannot recover the group secret key. 
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